Introduction
Benvenisti and Downs' article addresses a very complex topic which raises a host of difficult problems for which no clear and easy answers are readily available. Accordingly, and in view of the limited space that has been allocated for this response, I had to be selective and restrict myself by adding some other colours and different perspectives to the picture that has been painted by the authors. My response will start by discussing first the analytical framework before moving towards a critique in substance.
It should be noted from the outset that I generally agree with the analytical frame work and the diagnosis of the relation ship between national and international courts, their governments, and contract ing parties (i.e. their 'Masters'), their con straints and the various interests involved.
As the authors correctly point out, two main interrelated developments have been shaping the position and room for manoeuvre of national and international courts. Essentially, it can be stated that the proliferation of international courts and tribunals has resulted in an institution alization or 'thickening' of international law, giving these judicial and (quasi) judicial bodies extra power to shape the development of international law. But this proliferation of international courts and tribunals is simultaneously accom panied by the increasing fragmentation of international law because of the lack of a formal hierarchy between all the vari ous international judicial bodies. same time, it seems that national courts are increasingly losing their ability to protect their domestic legal systems from international law interference and their capacity effectively to shape the develop ment of international law. These opposing developments are, so it seems, handily played out against each other by clever governments. On the one hand, governments are keen to estab lish not only an innumerable number of international judicial bodies, but also all kinds of formal and informal institutions to tackle transnational problems, such as the financial crisis, the 'war' against terrorism, and efforts against global warming.
2 One of the main advantages of going global is that governments can agree on policies and instruments at the international level and then push them through at the domestic level by play ing the 'helpless' government which is obliged to enforce the policies adopted at the international level. A good exam ple of this is the continuously increas ing powers of law enforcement agencies to collect, store, and exchange personal data. In many countries we have reached an Orwellian level of preventive control measures, which normally would be incompatible with constitutionally pro tected fundamental rights but which nev ertheless have been implemented because they have been agreed upon at the Euro pean or international level.
3 In addition, the implementation of international and European law measures often takes place on a purely executive basis, thereby cir cumventing national parliaments and taking advantage of the nonexistence of parliamentary bodies at the international level (the only exception is probably the European Parliament). 4 Clearly, democ racy, transparency, and the rule of law are undermined by this tendency.
On the other hand, governments turn to their domestic courts to call on them to 'protect' their domestic constitutional values, principles, etc. against global influences which are perceived as endan gering or undermining their domestic legal systems.
5 Naturally, as is also under lined by Benvenisti and Downs, the prime 2 A good example is the proliferation of the vari ous formats and compositions of the meetings of the G5, G6, G7, G8, and G20 with very broad, informal agendas and unclear scopes of powers. Reference can be made to the ever increasing powers of Europol to collect and analyse data obtained through the Schengen Information System (SIS), which is also continuously being expanded, and national databases which have task of national courts, in particular the highest (constitutional) courts, is to pro tect the domestic system against undue internal and external interferences.
In short, governments play a dual role with a hypocritical touch by choosing the global or domestic level according to whatever fits best.
In their article Benvenisti and Downs propose interjudicial cooperation, judi cial dialogue, and other comparable (in) formal forms of cooperation between national courts as the best strategy for regaining some of their lost influence from the international courts and tribu nals. This strategy is not really novel or surprising, as it echoes the theory devel oped almost a decade ago by AnneMarie Slaughter, who forcefully posited the notion of a global community of inter national courts based on an increasing dialogue between international judicial bodies, which would eventually lead to a global community of courts.
6 Moreo ver, a similar strategy encompassing various types of judicial dialogue, such as the application of the Solange method (as long as method) not only between the German Constitutional Court and the ECJ, but also between the ECtHR and the ECJ, has been identified, which over comes the dichotomy of national courts v. international courts.
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So far, so good; and I generally share the analytical framework of Benvenisti and Downs.
Beyond Generalized Dichotomies
But in my view the dichotomies used by Benvenisti and Downs are too general. One cannot speak of 'the national courts', neither can one place all international (quasi) judicial bodies under the heading of 'the international courts'. Similarly, as I will discuss below, it is not always the case that national courts struggle against international courts; instead, sometimes national courts align themselves with international courts, and sometimes international courts struggle for leader ship against each other.
In the first place, it is important to emphasize that the many national politi cal and legal systems differ significantlyeven if we confine ourselves to the 27 EU Member States -a factor which directly affects the influence and room for manoeuvre of domestic courts, both domestically and internationally. For example, it matters whether or not a sys tem has a Constitutional Court, i.e., the German system which has one, in con trast to the Dutch system which does not. But even if one compares only systems which have Constitutional Courts, signif icant differences in their respective scopes of influence are visible, i.e., the German Constitutional Court compared with the French Conseil Constitutionnel. In other words, it is the almost unique, power ful, and independent position that the German Constitutional Court enjoys which enables it to play such a prominent role in influencing the jurisprudence in other European states, as well as in shaping the European integration process with its interaction with the ECJ and fundamen tal rights through its discourse with the ECtHR. Accordingly, most Constitutional Courts -even in the developed North or West -are, due to the lack of institutional power, simply unable actively to partici pate in interjudicial cooperation, let alone regain influence from the international courts. So this clearly complicates the rather general North-South dichotomy of national courts used by the authors. Therefore, I also doubt whether, as sug gested by the authors, real collective action involving a significant number of likeminded national courts would offer potential solutions. Similarly, it is important to highlight the substantial differences between inter national and national courts regarding the impact the various international courts actually have on the national. For example, if one compares the ECJ and the ICJ it becomes obvious that, due to the supremacy of Community law over all national law, ECJ judgments not only de facto bind all domestic courts within the Community but additionally supersede all constitutional law provisions of the EU Member States, 10 whereas the effect of ICJ judgments on domestic courts varies and depends on the relevant constitu tional provisions, but usually never has a comparable impact.
11 In contrast, judg ments of the ECtHR are usually taken into account by the domestic courts of the state concerned, which eventually leads to their effective implementation.
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In other words, there is a sliding scale of the direct impact of judgments of different international courts on national courts, the ECJ being at the top of this scale, fol lowed by the ECtHR, and the ICJ at the bot tom. Obviously, for nonEuropean states the scale would look different, which is another argument which proves that the use of the North-South dichotomy is not able comprehensively to address the very different situations even within the North, West, or developed countries. Besides, the impact of judgments amongst international (quasi)judicial bodies differs too. For example, a judgment of the ECtHR will under normal circumstances at least guide, if not bind, the ECJ when it adju dicates on cases involving fundamental rights. 13 Conversely, the ECtHR assumes that ECJ judgments are 'ECHR proof' and thus will no longer review them -unless in a case of 'manifestly deficient' funda mental rights protection.
14 In this sense, the ECtHR considers ECJ judgments on fundamental rights to be authoritative and binding for the domestic courts of the EU Member States, which happen to be also Contracting Parties to the ECHR. The same cannot be said of WTO Appellate Body rulings and their impact on the ECJ.
In this context, Benvenisti and Downs refer to the ECJ's FIAMM 15 judgment, which seems to me not to be a fitting example. First, in the paragraph on the selfdefined mission of national courts as guardians of their domestic legal orders the authors refer confusingly to the ECJ's FIAMM judgment as an example of 'con tinuing refusal to constrain their execu tives when such constraints might harm their economies for example by impos ing international trade law obligations on their executives'. 16 Clearly, even the most enthusiastic European integrationistsuch as this author -would not consider the ECJ to be a national court. Of course, one could argue that the ECJ is behaving like national (Constitutional) courts in protecting the autonomy of its 'domestic' legal order, that is, the Community legal order, and thus its exclusive jurisdiction against interferences from international law, 17 but, unlike national courts, the ECJ also has to fend off interferences by domestic courts of the EU Member States, such as, for example, from several Con stitutional Courts on the issue of the European Arrest Warrant.
18 Therefore, it seems strange to me to put the ECJ together with national courts in the same basket. See, e.g., Bures, 'European Arrest WarrantImplications for EU Counterterrorism efforts ', Central Eur J Int'l and Security Studies (2009) 21, available at: www.cejiss.org/assets/pdf/articles /vol31/BuresEuropean_Arrest_Warrant.pdf.
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Benvenisti and Downs, supra note 8, at 65, do this again when discussing the traditional defer ence of national courts to their executive branch es and then refer again in this context to the ECJ's FIAMM judgment, supra note 15.
Secondly, the reference to the WTO Appellate Body-ECJ nexus in this context is not so well chosen for another reason, which underlines my general point on the need to differentiate much more between the different types of courts. Indeed, the WTO Appellate Body-ECJ nexus is a prime example of the far more complex multilevel situation, rather than the bi polar dichotomy used by the authors.
It was in the context of the creation of the EC banana regime in the early 1990s that German courts swamped the ECJ with numerous requests for preliminary rulings challenging the longstanding refusal of the ECJ to take WTO Appel late Body rulings into account. 20 In other words, the German courts were trying to cooperate with the WTO Appellate Body in forcing the ECJ to change its jurisprudence -alas hitherto without success. So, the FIAMM example used by the authors was not so much about the refusal of the ECJ to constrain the EC executive, but rather about the efforts of national courts to convince the ECJ through the formal channel of interju dicial dialogue provided for by the pre liminary ruling procedure (Article 234 EC) to give effect to binding decisions of another international quasijudicial body, i.e., the WTO Appellate Body. In other words, intensive interjudicial coop eration between German courts and the WTO Appellate Body took place. Accord ingly, this example shows that putting the ECJ and national courts in the same basket is not very useful -at least in the WTO Appellate Body-ECJ nexus. so as to enable the prosecution of (former) heads of state and other high officials as well as individual perpetrators for various types of serious crimes which previously could not be prosecuted, which has done that. In contrast, the highly politicized framework in which the ICJ has to oper ate and its relatively slow and low output of judgments compared with that of ICTY or domestic courts has left the ICJ lagging behind in these fast developments. Conse quently, this has put the ICJ in the posi tion of slowing down rather than shaping as a front runner the developments in international law.
Towards Individualized, Regime-based Analytical Frameworks
As mentioned before, I share Benvenisti and Downs' principle argument that national courts must find ways to regain lost jurisdictional competence in order to be able to participate effectively in shap ing the development of international law. There can be no doubt that national courts play a fundamental dual role by ensuring the effective implementation of international law as well as by super vising and reviewing the decisions of the many formal and informal international bodies which have been established in recent decades, thereby adding some transparency, democratic control, and rule of law safeguards.
However, I find the dichotomies used by the authors to be too general and therefore not able sufficiently to cap ture the dynamic, complex, and varying configurations of the relationship and interaction between national courts and international courts. This is already illus trated by the fact that for every example the authors use it is not difficult to point to other examples which contradict or challenge the argument put forward. As the authors rightly argue, interjudi cial cooperation among national courts, among international courts, and between national and international courts prom ises to be the best strategy for enhanc ing the evolution of international law in a more transparent, democratic way based on the rule of law. But because of the dynamics and configurations of the interaction between national and inter national courts involved, it seems to me that is time to develop individualized, regimebased analytical frameworks which take into account regional specific characteristics rather than one overarch ing grand theory. This seems particularly important for Europe because of the pre dominant and influential role played by the ECJ, and to a lesser extent by the ECtHR, which cannot be compared with that in any other region. But even within Europe it would be necessary to zoom in even closer and distinguish between sys tems which have Constitutional Courts and those which do not, but also between systems with powerful Constitutional Courts and less powerful ones. Simi larly, it would be necessary to look more closely into the African, American, and Asian regions and take into account their specific characteristics and judicial and interjudicial configurations. This would make it possible to track and understand the various forms of interjudicial co operation much more comprehensively.
Thus, by way of conclusion, the work of Benvenisti and Downs is a useful starting point, which calls for further comprehen sive research which will develop individual ized, regimebased analytical frameworks.
